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Abstract-A random number generator based on the addition of points on an elliptic curve over 
finite fields is proposed. By using the proposed generator together with the elliptic curve cryptogra- 
phy (ECC) algorithm, we can save hardware and software components. For hardware implementation, 
the proposed generator can be implemented using the existing ECC arithmetic processor. Up to 29% 
of gate counts can be saved when compared to the case of implementing a random number generator 
separately. Theoretical analyses show that periods of the proposed random number generator are 
sufficiently long. Moreover, the generated sequences have passed the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests. As 
a result, the proposed generator is suitable to be a reliable and efficient random number generator in 
ECC systems. @ 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) h as received intense scrutiny from cryptographers, 
mathematicians, and computer scientists around the world [l-3]. The primary reason for this is 
its high security over existing public key cryptographic algorithms. The best algorithm known 
for solving the underlying mathematical problem of ECC, referred to as the elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem (ECDLP), takes full exponential time. On the contrary, subexponential-time 
algorithms are known for tackling the integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problems 
that RSA and DSA are relied on [4,5]. This implies that the algorithms for solving the ellip- 
tic curve discrete logarithm problem become infeasible much more rapidly as the problem size 
increases than those algorithms for tackling the integer factorization and the discrete logarithm 
problems. For this reason, ECC offers a security level equivalent to RSA and DSA while using a 
far smaller key size [l]. 
On the other hand, the security of most cryptographic systems depends upon the generation 
of unpredictable quantities that must be of sufficient size and randomness. Taking ECC as an 
example, we need to generate random bits in order to create random curves and the large secret 
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integer [l-3]. The purpose is to preclude third parties from gaining advantage through optimizing 
a search strategy. This implies that we usually need to implement a random number generator 
in a cryptographic system. A number of random number generators have been proposed [6-Q]. 
However, they are usually not designed together with the cryptographic system and so extra 
design and implementation effort are required. If both the tasks of random number generation 
and encryption can be done by using the same software or hardware module, we can save hardware 
cost, memory space, and design time. This is especially important in developing applications in 
environment with limited resources such as smart cards. With this goal, we propose a random 
number generator that makes use of the basic operations required in ECC. 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the background of ECC 
and the proposed random number generator will be described. Periods of the proposed generator 
are analyzed in Section 3, while the test results are reported in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, 
discussions and conclusions are made. 
2. THE PROPOSED 
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR 
In elliptic curve operations, multiplying an integer k to a point P on the curve is equivalent to 
adding P to itself for (k - 1) times [3]. This is referred to as the “kP” operation. In particular, 
an integer T is called the order of the point P if rP = 0 (where 0 is the point at infinity). 
By converting lc into binary form, making use of Koblitz’s balance equation, and then using the 
addition and double rules of elliptic curve operations, the ICP operation can be done rapidly [3]. In 
practical cryptographic systems, we only use elliptic curves over finite fields [l]. As our aim is to 
integrate a random number generator in a cryptographic system, only finite fields are concerned 
here. These fields include prime integer, polynomial basis, and normal basis fields. 
A block diagram of the proposed random number generator is shown in Figure 1. Its structure 
is basically the same for the three fields. However, different fields lead to different modulo 
Seed kl 
(first cycle only) 
Bit Sequence Output 
Figure 1. Block diagram of the proposed random number generator. 
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operations [3]. For a prime integer field, we apply all rules end with reduction modulo a large 
prime number, i.e., the field size. For polynomial basis, all the arithmetic operations are reduced 
modulo by a prime polynomial. Therefore, one of the processes in the proposed random number 
generation varies according to the choice of finite fields. For simplicity, Figure 1 only shows the 
general case. Details of the variation will be described later. 
In Figure 1, the k,,P module performs the kP operation, in the nth cycle, upon a high-order 
point P on a nonsupersingular elliptic curve. Initially, the finite field F, the elliptic curve E, the 
point P, and the seed kl are chosen. The bit length of ki depends on the size of the finite field 
and its value should not he equal to the order of P over that finite field. This prevents klP from 
being the point at infinity. After k,, is fed into the k,,P module, a point k,P is generated. The 
z-coordinate of this new point is added to the current cycle number to form the new seed krlfl 
for the next cycle. In this addition process, the operaCon is different for the three fields. 
(1) For a prime integer field, krL+l = cc,, + n(modp) where p is the field size. 
(2) For polynomial basis, kn+i = z,, + n(modp(z)) where p(x) is tl ie irreducible polynomial. 
Although x,, represents the coefficients of a polynomial and 1~ is the cycle number, they 
can be added together its II can be treated as a binary representation of a polynomial. 
(3) For normal basis, k,,+l = x,, + II, as depicted in the figure. Ko modulo operation is 
required. 
When these operations are done recursively, a sequence of bits can be obtained by collecting 
the z,,s. However, there is still a chance, although very small, that k,,P is the point at infinity. If 
this situation occurs, that point will be discarded and a new point will be regenerated by setting 
k, = y+i + II - 1, where Y,~-~ is the y-coordinate of k,-iP, instead of k,,, = z,-~ + II - 1. For 
a clear presentation of the flow of the random number generation, this special case is not shown 
in Figure 1. 
3. PERIOD ANALYSIS 
The purpose of setting k,,+i = z,, + n is to increase the period of the generator. If n is not 
added, the bit sequence depends solely on the output of the kP operation. It will start to repeat 
itself when there exists an x,-, (where 1 < i < ‘n) such that xrL = z,-,. For example, if the 
z-coordinate of 1OP is 13 and a pattern: 13, 3, 10 was generated in the past three cycles, this 
pattern will repeat itself in the subsequent cycles. However, if 71 is added to z,, the period mill 
be governed by the field size which is usually very large. This property is shown clearly by the 
following analyses. 
3.1. Prime Integer Field 
In the sth cycle, 
k s+1= 2s + s(modp), (1) 
where Z, is the output of the k,,P module shown in Figure 1. 
In the tt” cycle, 
kt+l = xt + t(modp), (2) 
where xt is the output of the k,P module and t > s. 
Suppose that the output of the k,,P module in the tth cycle is the same as that of the sth cycle. 
That is, 
3’t = z,. (3) 
If the output of the k,P module of the (t + l)th cycle is also equal to that of the (s + l)t” cycle, 
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then &+I must equal to Ic,+i. By (1) and (2), we have 
xt + t = x, + s(modp). (4) 
Making use of (3)) (4) becomes 
t = s(modp). (5) 
Since t > s, we have t = s + qp, where q is a nonzero positive integer. Hence, the output pattern 
will repeat only after p cycles. 
3.2. Polynomial Basis 
The period analysis for polynomial basis is the same as that for prime integer field except that 
the field size p is replaced by the irreducible polynomial p(x). Therefore, the proof is not repeated 
here. 
3.3. Normal Basis 
Unlike the prime integer and the polynomial basis fields, the ECC operations over normal basis 
do not need to get through a modulus operation. Therefore, the mod operation in equation (5) 
can be removed. However, since t > s, the actual relationship between t and s is 
(6) 
where 2” is the field size of the field Fp. As a result, t and s will be the same when the former 
leads the latter by a multiplier of the field size. Table 1 shows an example for Fp. In the last 
column (n = 23), the patterns are exactly the same as those listed in the column correspond to 
n = 0. This is because k,+i should always be an element of Fp. No matter how large n is, the 
value of Ic, is limited to three bits. Hence, the output pattern will repeat after 2” cycles. 
Table 1. Iteration result of k,+l = z, + n for Fzs. 
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (‘3 (7) 
001 000 011 010 101 100 111 110 
010 011 000 001 110 111 100 101 
110 111 100 101 010 011 000 001 
4. TEST RESULTS 
Besides the period, another important issue that we are concerned about a random number 
generator is the distribution of the bits generated [7,8]. The output sequence of the generator has 
to go through standard statistical tests as specified in FIPS 140-2 [lo] for a test of randomness. 
FIPS is referred to as the United States Government Federal Information Processing Standard, 
a publication of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The FIPS 140-2 specifica- 
tion describes government requirements on cryptographic modules for sensitive, but unclassified 
use. The corresponding test suite provides measures of four characteristics of a random number 
generator output. 
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1. MONOBIT TEST. Test the duty cycle by examining the balance of the single bits, ‘O’s and ‘l’s, 
i.e., the number of ones divided by the total bits generated. 
2. POKER TEST. Test the relative occurrence of four-bit strings, i.e., the number of occurrences 
of each of the 16 possible four-bit combinations. 
3. RUNS TEST. Test runs of consecutive like bits, i.e., to check various consecutive occurrences 
of ‘l’s or ‘0’s. 
4. LONG RUN TEST. Test the absence of runs of 26 or more like bits. 
In our experiment, 30 bit sequences are generated for each of the three finite fields by using 
30 pairs of the randomly-selected initial point P and the seed kl. They are then subjected to 
the FIPS 140-2 tests. If there is a sequence that fails in any of the tests, the proposed generator 
is rejected from being considered as a random number generator. Details of the simulations are 
given below. 
4.1. Prime Integer Field 
The curve y2 = x3 + a4x + a6 is used here and the parameters are 
a4 = 04 3182D283 FCE38807 30C9A2FD D3F60165 29A166AF, 
a6 = 02 OC61E945 9E53D887 lBCAADC2 DFC8AD52 25228035, 
Field Size p = 05 177B8A2A OFDGA4FF 55CDAOGB 09243125 F86CAD9B. 
All the bit sequences generated by the 30 pairs of random parameters of P and kl have passed 
the FIPS 140-2 tests. Among them, three cases are listed here for reference. 
CASE 1. 
P(q y) = (00 17370122 77ElB4E4 3F7BF746 57E8BE08 BACA175B, 00 AA03AOA8 
26907046 97E8C504 CB135B2B 6EEF3C83), 
ICI = 03 177B8A2A OFD674FF 556AA7B8 A7851F88 BD53B2Cl. 
CASE 2. 
P(,, y) = (00 17370122 77ElB4E4 3F7BF746 57E8BE08 BACA175B, 00 AA03AOA8 
26907046 97E8C504 CB135B2B 6EEF3C83), 
k1 = 01 1537AB48 397E4CD4 37F23A9C A23C9B75 455552FD. 
CASE 3. 
P(x, y) = (01 DClE9A48 2085B3DF A722EB7A 541D5050 5ED31DCA, 01 2D71ECCl 
578BFBE2 03DOC2CE 238EB606 OADCAAIE), 
k1 = 02 4563ED51 81DBC76A 31EFDC45 96AC5B6A 7EFC45BO. 
The results of the statistical tests for these three cases are listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. FIPS 140-2 statistical test results of the output sequences in prime integer 
field. 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Statistical Test Required Interval output output output 
Value Value Value 
(Xl w W) 
Monobit Test 9725 < X < 10275 9827 9929 9835 
Poker Test 2.16 < X < 46.17 23.1456 12.0160 21.3536 
Run = 1, 2243 5 X 5 2657 2546 2529 2579 
Run = 2, 1135 5 X 5 1365 1251 1226 1191 
Runs Test for ‘1’ Run = 3, 542 _< X 5 708 597 641 613 
Run = 4, 251 5 X 5 373 330 324 325 
Run = 5, 111 5 X 5 201 146 156 133 
Run 2 6, 111 5 X 5 201 138 138 150 
Run = 1, 2243 5 X 5 2657 2531 2552 2583 
Run = 2, 1135 5 X 5 1365 1263 1263 1154 
Runs test for ‘0’ Run = 3, 542 5 X 5 708 583 635 645 
Run = 4, 251 5 X 5 373 342 324 305 
Run = 5, 111 5 X 5 201 163 141 132 
Run > 6, 111 5 X 5 201 130 133 147 
Long Run Test Run > 26, X = 0 0 0 0 
Final Result PASS PASS PASS 
4.2. Polynomial Basis 
The curve y2 + zy = x3 + ~22 + as is used here and the parameters are 
a2 = 02 5C4BEAC8 074B8C2D 9DF63AF9 1263EB82 29B3C967, 
0,s = 00 C9517D06 D5240D3C FF38C74B 20B6CD4D 6F9DD4D9, 
Irreducible Polynomial p(x) = 04 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000107 
(X lcj3 + x8 + x2 + 2 + 1) 
All the bit sequences generated by the 30 pairs of random parameters of P and Ici have passed 
the FIPS 140-2 tests. Among them, three sets are listed here for reference. 
CASE 1. 
P(q y) = (04 34242935 9B4E1052 22276931 AB51C17A 53EAB862, 01 02FB92FE 
EB65AD06 8469D2DD 15BC0906 C9520891), 
Ici = 00 D2COFB15 760860DE FlEEF4D6 96E67687 56151754. 
CASE 2. 
P(x, y) = (02 3A2E9990 49963867 9B50FFlE 49ADD8BD 2388F387, 05 FCBFE409 
8477C9Dl 87EAlCF6 15C7E915 29E73BA2), 
ICI = 01 C368944D 69636768 75615175 FF31C825 CC82534A. , 
CASE 3. 
P(z, y) = (03 85370316 D171C67A C6C74463 9CCF27B9 7CDAFCC9, 06 D5323AEA 
D193FB57 BB37878A 46125B5A ACElA5C2), 
Icr = 02 4563ED51 81DBC76A 31EFDC45 96AC5B6A 7EFC45BO. 
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The results of the statistical tests for these three cases are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. FIPS 140-2 statistical test results of the output sequences in polynomial 
basis field. 
Case 1 Case 2 
Statistical Test Required Interval Output output 
Value Value 
(X) (W 
Monobit Test 9725 < X < 10275 9936 9962 
Poker Test 2.16 < X < 46.17 22.1362 28.0451 
Run = 1, 2243 5 X < 2657 2456 2542 
Run = 2, 1135 5 X < 1365 1252 1246 
Runs Test for ‘1’ Run = 3, 542 5 X < 708 620 599 
Run=4, 251<X<373 293 311 
Run = 5, 111 5 X < 201 169 134 
Run 2 6, 111 5 X 5 201 172 169 
Run = 1, 2243 5 X < 2657 2521 2552 
Run = 2; 113.5 5 X 5 1365 1224 1263 
Runs Test for ‘0’ Run = 3, 542 5 X < 708 636 635 
Run = 4, 251 5 X 5 373 34x 356 
Run = 5, 111 5 X <_ 201 145 154 
nun 6. 111 X 201 2 5 5 139 165 
Long Run Test Run 2 26, X = 0 0 0 
Final Result PASS PASS 
4.3. Normal Basis 
The curve y2 + zy = x3 + a2x + a6 is used here and the parameters are 
a2 = 07 EBCB7EEC C296AlC4 AlA14F2C 93443523, 





















All the bit sequences generated by the 30 pairs of random parameters of P and Icr have passed 
the FIPS 140-2 tests. Among them, three sets are listed here for reference. 
CASE 1. 
P(,? y) = (01 DB221DEB 61DC208A DA4D8888 5A787969, 07 81B4EEEA 7DBDE2FE 
9BE142DA E37BDF96), 
Icr = 00 4D696367 68756151 750A6732 71EA86E3. 
CASE 2. 
P(z-,y) = (00 439CBC8D C73AA981 030D5BC5 7B331663, 01 4904C07D 4F25A16C 
2DE036D6 OB762BD4), 
kl = 01 5554D696 E6768756 1517586A A17BF3F4. 
CASE 3. 
P(z,y) = (00 03B50139 9F4A5D28 860EA3B5 6C689OC1, 00 AFlA352D D10974DB 
899C6685 BDBB7CB6), 
kr = 02 328DOAE9 E6124D69 63676875 61517565. 
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The results of the statistical tests for these three cases are listed in Table 4. 
Besides the FIPS 140-2 tests, the performance of the proposed random number generator 
can also be evaluated by the normalized first-return map. It is formed by collecting the z 
value obtained in each iteration and then plotting the values of two consecutive iterations, 
G and x,+1, against each other. By observing this map, we can determine whether xn+r can be 
predicted by x,. The maps of Case 2 for the three finite fields are plotted in Figures 2-4, respec- 
tively. They show that the points are uniformly distributed and so it is difficult to predict zn+i 
from xn. 





Runs Test for ‘1’ 
Runs Test for ‘0’ 
Long Run Test 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Required Interval output output output 
Value Value Value 
c-v (X) w 
9725 < X < 10275 9823 9882 9962 
2.16 < X < 46.17 26.1546 29.2541 21.6597 
Run = 1, 2243 5 X < 2657 2498 2574 2521 
Run = 2, 1135 5 X < 1365 1254 1235 1267 
Run = 3, 542 5 X 5 708 593 615 669 
Run = 4, 251 _< X < 373 276 311 297 
Run = 5, 111 5 X < 201 167 185 154 
Run 16, 111 5 X 5 201 167 165 132 
Run = 1, 2243 5 X 5 2657 2598 2578 2556 
Run = 2, 1135 2 X 5 1365 1254 1278 1297 
Run = 3, 542 5 X 5 708 647 611 665 
Run = 4, 251 5 X 5 373 297 312 310 
Run = 5, 111 5 X < 201 136 187 144 
Run 16, 111 5 X _< 201 156 165 168 
Run 2 26, X = 0 0 0 0 




Figure 2. Normalized first-return map of Case 2 (prime integer field). 
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Figure 3. Normalized first-return map of Case 2 (polynomial basis). 
E 
X 
Figure 4. Normalized first-return map of Case 2 (normal basis). 
5. DISCUSSIONS 
5.1. Choice of Parameters 
The test results indicate that all the random number sequences generated over the three fields 
have passed the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests. Moreover, the first return maps show that it is 
difficult to predict x,+1 from 5,. Therefore, the proposed generator can be accepted as a reliable 
random number generator for integrating with the ECC system to generate the dynamic private 
keys. 
By simply changing the seed Ici and the initial point P, a different bit sequence can be gener- 
ated. These two parameters should be kept secret for security. Basically, P can be any point on 
the elliptic curve. However, if we integrate this generator with an ECC cryptographic system, 
P should not be the point used in the ECC part. This is because those points are always treated 
as the parameters of public keys which are made public. 
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5.2. Hardware Implementations 
Various hardware implementations of ECC processors have been proposed [ll-141. The FPGA 
implementations of two different F~s ECC arithmetic processors require an equivalent of 11,000 
gates [ll] and 17,000 gates [12], respectively. A recent design over the F~o field requires 14,298 
gates [13]. On the other hand, the FPGA implementation of a parallel random number generator 
was also proposed [15]. The generator is formed by a chain of unit cells. In each unit cell, 
there are two XOR logic gates, two flip-flops, a delay element, and a 16-bit RAM. To generate 
a random sequence with equivalent period as that by an F~IS ECC random number generator, 
16 unit cells are required [15]. This needs an equivalent of approximately 3200 logic gates, i.e., 
29% and 19% of the gate counts required in the implementation of the ECC arithmetic processor 
reported in [ll] and [12], respectively. For the proposed ECC random number generator, this 
save in the number of gates is quite substantial on resource-constrained implementations such as 
smart cards. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a new approach for constructing a random number generator using the basic 
operations in ECC is presented. Periods of the generator are analyzed theoretically. Moreover, bit 
sequences generated randomly have passed the standard tests and so they possess a satisfactory 
degree of randomness. Nowadays, ECC is accepted as a cryptographic standard and there will be 
an increasing number of cryptographic processors and software specially designed for it. Since our 
proposed random number generator is based on the core operations of ECC, it can be designed 
and implemented efficiently using the existing components. As a result, up to 29% of gate counts 
can be saved when compared to the implementation of a parallel random number generator 
separately. 
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